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Abstract

By defending the following views – that Aristotle identifies the generator
and perhaps the obstacle remover (in an extended sense) as an essential
cause of the natural sublunary elemental motion in Physics VIII 4; that
this view is consistent with the view of Physics II 1 that the sublunary
simple bodies have a principle of internal motion; and that the sublunary
and the celestial elements have a nature in the very same way – I shall offer
what has so far eluded Aristotelian commentators: a consistent interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the natural motions of the sublunary and also
the celestial elements.
Keywords: Aristotle, Physics, Soul, Elemental Motion, aether

I
In Physics VIII 4, Aristotle defends the view that whatever is in motion is
moved by something. The most difficult problem ‘ma/lista d' a0porei=tai’1
Aristotle sees, and devotes the bulk of the chapter resolving, is the problem
of identifying the mover of the natural motion of ‘the light and the heavy’2.
His solution is that their natural motion is caused by either whatever gener1
2

245b33.
255a2. In this paper, the natural motion of the heavy and the light is identified as
the natural motion of the four sublunary elements – earth, water, air, and fire (see
Aristotle’s examples at 255a29, b9, b9 and a28, respectively). Cf. Solmsen 1960, 258.
Furthermore, just as Aristotle refers to earth, water, air and fire as both ’elements’
(for example, Cael IV 2, 310a5–6) and ‘simple bodies’ (for example, Phys II 1,
192b10), I shall use these terms interchangeably. Cf. Solmsen 1960, 100.
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ated them that caused the bodies to be either light or heavy (henceforward,
the generator) or whatever removed the impediment or the obstacle that
blocked their natural motion (henceforward, the obstacle remover). Commentators have, however, found Aristotle's solution very puzzling.
The difficulties can be summarized by the following three separate
(but inter-related) aporiai. The first is that the external movers of the natural motion of the light and the heavy (their generators and obstacle removers) seem to be merely the accidental, and not the essential, causes. On
the one hand, as Aristotle himself admits3, the obstacle remover seems to
be a blatant example of accidental cause. On the other hand, it is also
difficult to see how the generator could be an essential cause. What has
generated, for example, air from water does not seem to be the essential
external cause of air moving upwards, for generating the air and moving it
would seem to require two different causes. Whatever generates air is indeed conferring on it motion in a sense of generating the element that has
the potential to move upwards but this is different from imparting motion
in the sense that it is the actual cause of realizing the air's potentiality for
upward motion4. But if, as it appears, he has provided us only with the
accidental movers of the natural sublunary elemental motions, he has
failed to show their real mover and thereby unsuccessfully defended his
main thesis that everything in motion is moved by something5.
The second aporia6 is that the view defended in Physics VIII 4 seems
to be inconsistent with the one found in Physics II 1. There Aristotle
claims that the sublunary simple bodies have an internal, and not an external, principle of motion7. If the natural motion of the sublunary simple
bodies is not an instance of self-motion, since the heaviness and the lightness in the simple bodies that are responsible for their motions require an
essential external mover, then it would seem that the simple bodies no
longer have an internal principle of motion.
The third and final aporia is concerned with Aristotle’s theory of the
natural motion of the celestial element – aether. In the first book of de Caelo,
based on a close analogy Aristotle draws between the sublunary and the celestial elements, he argues for the number and the kinds of physical elements
that exist in the universe8. Aristotle draws this analogy despite vast differences that exist between them: sublunary elements are inanimate, they are
generated and destroyed, their motions are rectilinear, and they tend towards

3
4
5
6
7
8

255b24–9. Cf. Meyer 1994, 77.
See Graham 1999, 88–9.
See, Lang 1992, 68.
See Cohen 1994, 153.
See also Cael IV 1, 308a2. Cf. Solmsen 1960, 276.
This conclusion is reached at Cael I 8, 277b24–6.
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their natural resting places; in contrast, the celestial element is animate, it is
ungenerable and indestructible, its motions is circular, and it moves continuously without ceasing. What commentators find intractable is to present a
consistent interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the natural motions of both
the sublunary and the celestial elements and to do so without destroying the
analogy9 between them. The purported solution of Physics VIIII 4 seems inapplicable; for the celestial motion, in principle, can neither be explained in
terms of its generator (since it is ungenerable and indestructible), nor in
terms of the obstacle remover (since nothing can obstruct or impede its motion); that is, it has neither generator nor obstacle remover10.
Thus, the successful exegete of Aristotle's theory of the natural sublunary elemental motion found in Physics VIII 4 is required to solve at least
the three aporiai just outlined. In this paper, I shall offer solutions (luseis)
to these aporiai. In the resolution of the first aporia, I shall argue for the
following: 1) that, both in the de Caelo and Physics VIII 4, Aristotle holds
the view that the sublunary elements have a principle of both motion and
rest and that this view can be captured by ‘the precise formulation of the
doctrine of natural places’ (NP); 2) that to identify the movers of the
natural sublunary elemental motion Aristotle appeals to ‘the notion of the
active capacity’ (AC) and that AC can be used to justify NP; and 3) that,
based on NP and AC in conjunction with the consistent application of
‘the soul (as the mover)/ the body (as the moved) distinction’ (S/B), it is
the generator (or perhaps the obstacle remover in an extended sense as
well) that is the essential cause of the sublunary elemental motion.
In the resolution of the second aporia, I shall apply NP, AC and S/B
to both the natural substances and artifacts that are discussed in Physics II
1 to show the unique way in which the elements come to possess the
active capacity in virtue of which their internal principle of motion can be
defined as the moved. I shall, then, summarize the list of different sublunary entities using ‘the scheme of classification of the principles of motion’
(SC) similar to the one that Aristotle himself outlines in Physics VIII 4
and, thereby, show the consistency between II 1 and VIII 4.
Finally, in the resolution of the third aporia, I shall employ all of the
four doctrines – ‘the precise formulation of the doctrine of natural places’
(NP), ‘the notion of active capacity’ (AC), ‘the soul (as the mover)/the
body (as the moved) distinction’ (S/B) and ‘the scheme of classification of
the principles of motion’ (SC) – that I have ascribed to Aristotle to account for his theory of the natural motion of the sublunary elements.
Consequently, without introducing any problematic disanalogy between
the sublunary and the celestial elements, I shall show that all five elements
9
10

See, for example, Judson 1994, 158–9. Cf. Guthrie 1939, xxxii-xxxiii.
See Bodnár 1997, 109 ff. Cf. Graham 1999, 88.
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have nature in the same way. Thus, the ultimate result of the resolutions
of the three aporiai is to offer what has so far eluded Aristotelian commentators: a consistent interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the natural
motions of both the sublunary and the celestial elements.

II
My solution (lusis) to the first aporia is that in Physics VIII 4 Aristotle indeed
identifies the generator (and perhaps the obstacle remover as well, albeit in
an extended sense) as an essential, and not an accidental, mover of the natural motion of the sublunary elements. My argument consists of three stages: i)
the defense of NP; ii) the defense of AC and its relation to NP; and iii) the
application of NP and AC in conjunction with S/B to solve the problem.
i
There is a controversy as to whether the sublunary elements are by nature at
rest or in motion. Some11 have argued that the sublunary elements only have
a principle of rest but not a principle of motion, while others12 have argued
for the reverse, that they only have a principle of motion but not a principle
of rest13. The basic problem with both views is that, as we shall see, there are
a number of passages that suggest that according to Aristotle the sublunary
elements have a principle of both motion and rest. In order to settle this
dispute, we need to explore what is called ‘the doctrine of natural places’.
Williams 1982 formulates the doctrine of natural places14 as follows:
[T]o be heavy is to have a tendency to move towards the center, to be light to have
a tendency to move towards the circumference, of the sublunary sphere; the natural
place of an object is that to which it has a tendency to move (114).

I shall call this the standard formulation of the doctrine of natural places.
In it, ‘the heavy’ and ‘the light’ are both understood in terms of their
11
12
13
14

For example, see Cohen 1994.
For example, see Gill 1989, 236–240 and Gill 1991, 31.
See also Bodnár 1997 for a number of criticisms against their views (90–8).
Morison 2002 points out that Aristotle does not speak of natural (fusikoi/) places,
since natural ‘can qualify “motion” or “rest”, but not “place”’(34). However, since this
celebrated doctrine is so widely used and recognizable, I shall maintain its usage in
this paper. In addition, contra Morison 2002, 32 (note 100), since ‘proper’ is widely
used translation for oi0kei=oj (see, for example, the following translators: Guthrie
1936, Stocks in Barnes 1984, Leggat 1995, Hankinson 2004, and Meuller 2005) in
the context of referring to element’s natural places, I shall keep this common usage
and use the terms, ‘natural place’ and ‘proper place’, interchangeably.
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capacity to be moved to their respective places; that is ‘to be light’ or ‘to
be heavy’ is defined as having the tendency to move to its natural place.
This standard formulation can be justified by a number of passages in de
Caelo, especially from Book I15, where they are defined in terms of motion.
Although the formulation is not incorrect, it could be misleading if
we fail to taken into account the Book IV 3, 311a2–3 passage, where
Aristotle describes the upward motion of air after it is being generated
from water. Here Aristotle emphasizes that the air no longer becomes light
but is light when it arrives at the upper region. The Greek text is this:
‘a3ma d' e0sti\ kou=fon, kai\ ou0ke/ti gi/getai, a0ll' e0kei= e1stin.’ What this
passage suggests is that ‘to be light’ is not to have the tendency to be
moved but to be in its natural place; thus, a body's motion towards its
natural place is described as the motion towards its own form (de Caelo
IV 3, 310a33–4).
This apparent discrepancy between the Book IV 3 passage and the
others can be easily resolved if we turn to the Book I 3, 269b20–6 passage, where Aristotle explicitly points out that here what we mean by the
heavy and the light are imprecise and that he will give a more precise
account when he examines their substance (ou0si/a)16. The implication is
that Aristotle draws a distinction between the precise (or the strict) and
the imprecise (or the loose) senses of the heavy and the light.
This distinction also occurs in Physics VIII 4. The strict sense occurs
at 255b11, when he says ‘the actuality of the light is to be somewhere,
namely up (e0ne/rgeia de\ tou= kou/fou to\ pou\ ei}nai kai\ a1nw)’; and, the
loose sense occurs at 255b15–16, when he defines what it is to be light
and what it is to be the heavy as literally in Greek: ‘it is their nature to
[tend] to some place (pe/fuke/n poi)17’. No verb appears in Greek and
one must be supplied by a translator. Since the adverb poi means ‘somewhither’ or ‘to some place’18, some kind of a verb, indicating a movement
towards certain place, needs to be supplied. Note that the strict sense de15
16

17
18

See, for example, I 3, 269b23–6 and I 8, 276a22–30. Cf. IV 1, 307b31–2.
The imprecision that Aristotle mentions here does not refer merely (if at all) to the
difference between the relative and the absolute senses of the heavy and the light,
even though at IV 1, 308a9–13, Aristotle highlights that his predecessors treated
only the relative sense and failed to take into account of the absolute sense, because
1) the imprecise account includes the distinction between the absolute and the relative senses of the heavy and the light at 269b24–6; and 2) the new information in
the Book IV 3 passage adds to our understanding of the ‘substance’ (ou0si/a) of the
heavy and the light.
Simplicius' gloss, however, is pou (In Phys., 1216, 15). Cf. the apparatus criticus of
Ross 1936.
Cf. Liddell and Scott 1940 and Smyth 1984, 102.
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fines the actuality of the light (and the heavy) and the loose sense their
potentiality19. Since, for Aristotle, actuality is prior20 to potentiality21, the
account of the heavy and the light in terms of rest (which reveals their
actuality or their substance) is more precise than their account in term of
motion (which reveals their potentiality).
I shall, therefore, suggest the following ‘precise formulation of the
doctrine of natural places’ (NP) that incorporates both the strict and the
loose senses of the heavy and the light: ‘to be heavy in the strict sense is
to be in the center of the sublunary sphere and in the loose sense is to
have a tendency to move towards it, to be light in the strict sense is to be
in the circumference of the sublunary sphere and in the loose sense is to
have a tendency to move towards it; the natural place of an element is
defined primarily as that in which it rests naturally and secondarily as that
to which it has a tendency to move’22. For example, fire's natural place is
in the upper region of the sublunary realm and its natural motion is to
move upwards; if fire is located anywhere else, it is brought to that place
by force and remains there by force. In other words, fire is light in the
strict sense when it rests in its natural place and it is light in the loose
sense when it is becoming light (or has the tendency to be light) by being
moved to its natural place. Based on NP, we can now resolve the dispute:
that, contrary to what some scholars have defended, the sublunary elements have a principle of both motion (in a loose sense) and rest (in a
strict sense).
An implication of accepting NP is that sublunary elements are unable to
move themselves away from their natural places. Rather, they are displaced
from their natural places only by force23 and remain in their unnatural
regions only by force. Their natural motions occur, therefore, only as the
result of their being displaced by force from their natural places. In the
celebrated passage of de Generatione et Corruptione II 10, 337a7–15, Aristotle points out that in an infinite duration of time, all elements moving

19
20

21
22

23

At 255b17–21, the weak sense is formulated for the purpose of explaining different
senses of potentiality.
In this paper, rest is taken to be prior to motion within the context of explicating
the doctrine of natural places. In some other contexts, rest is understood as a privation of motion (Caelo, II 3, 286a26–2). Cf. Elders 1965, 194 and 285. See also
Theophrastus' Metaphysics, 7b11–15.
See Metaphys Q8.
See Morison 2002: ‘The theory is supposed to account not only for the directions of
the natural movements of the elements, but also for the destinations of these movements (i.e. where the elements will naturally come to a stop if they are not impeded
beforehand or forced onwards by something else’ (31; his emphasis). Cf. Waterlow
1982, 242–3; Hussey 1983, 118; and Wedin 1994, 95.
See Phys VIII 3, 253b33–5.
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towards their natural places would have separated out and remained in
their own places if not for their transformations into one another. But
sublunary elements do not cause their transformations on their own;
rather, the transformations are caused externally by the movements of the
celestial bodies24. I shall argue that in Physics VIII 4, indeed these celestial
bodies (along with other agents) construed as generators are the essential
causes of the natural sublunary elemental motions. At this stage of the
argument, however, I will like to underscore that according to NP, without any external cause, the sublunary elements will always be in their natural places.
ii
Having now defended NP, let me now turn to AC and its relation to NP.
At 155a30–2, Aristotle himself emphasizes that the identity of the movers
of the natural sublunary motions is not apparent because potentiality is
spoken of in many senses. I shall now argue that when Aristotle draws the
distinction between the two senses of potentiality, he is appealing to what I
am calling ‘the notion of active capacity’ (AC). In Physics VIII 4, the two
senses of potentiality are explained in terms of different senses of the potential knower: one who is learning knowledge and the other who has acquired knowledge but is not using it. Once one is a potential knower in
the second sense, one will immediately actualize and use knowledge, if
nothing prevents him. The crucial claim made by Aristotle is that a similar
distinction is also found in the case of physical things (e0pi\ tw=n fusikw=n),
including the heavy and the light. A thing can be potentially light in different senses: for example, water is potentially light, but once it is transformed
into air, the air is potentially light but in a different sense, for it is light in
the sense that it will be active immediately, if nothing prevents it
(255b1–13). What we need to explain clearly is this analogy that Aristotle
is drawing between the knower example and physical things. But first let us
examine the knower example in detail.
The different senses of potentiality as well as actuality (exemplified by
the knower example) are expounded in de Anima II 5 as follows: 1) the
one who has the ability to attain knowledge; 2) the one who has attained
knowledge but is not using it; and 3) the one who is actually contemplating. A knower 1) and a knower 2) are both potential knowers but in
24

Specifically, the double movements of the Sun. See de Gen. et Corr. II 10, 336a32-b4.
See also Theophrastus' Metaphyiscs, 5b23–6 and 7b2–5. Cf., for example, Williams
1982, 186 and Gill 1989, 68. See also Meteor I 2, 339a11–32 and Lee’s comments
(1952, 8–9 [note c]).
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different senses; and a knower 2) and a knower 3) are both actual knowers
but in different senses. There are also two corresponding transitions from
potential to actual knower: from senses 1) to 2); and from senses 2) to 3).
The first transition involves a kind of destruction by a contrary such that
the change occurs from one contrary disposition to another; while the
second transition involves the preservation of a disposition25.
The customary interpretation, based on passages such as de Anima
II 5, 417a16–17 and III 7, 431a6–7, is that the first transition is called
motion, which is an incomplete activity, while the second one is called
activity in a proper sense, which is a complete activity. This standard
distinction26 between activity and motion can be illustrated using a
builder who is constructing a building. In the builder, there is a transition from not exercising the capacity to build to activating that capacity,
without any alteration on the part of the builder27; but it is the building materials themselves that undergo the process of change and alteration28.
Recently, however, de Anima II 5 has received detailed attentions,
most notably by Burnyeat 2002 and Heinaman 2007, who challenged this
standard interpretation. Burnyeat denies that the first transition is an ordinary alteration but argues rather that it is an unordinary one29; and in
his criticisms of Burnyeat, Heinaman denies that the second transition is
an activity but points out that at de Anima 417b1, this transition is to
activity30. Furthermore, in Burnyeat 2008 (his most recent paper on the
subject of the motion/activity distinction), he argues against the use of
such a distinction as a standard Aristotelian doctrine31.
The task of my paper is not to enter into, or to resolve, the controversies generated by either Burnyeat or Heinaman, but to examine how Aristotle is using the analogy to identify the mover of the natural motion of
sublunary elements. In view of this, I shall sidestep their controversies: instead of referring to the two transitions in terms of the traditional motion/activity distinction, I shall simply refer to them as the first and the
second transitions.
Of the two transitions, it is the second one that is at issue. This transition is rather perplexing in terms of its application to physical things. In
the case of a knower, this transition is instantaneous. Because of this, commentators had not drawn a distinction between the transition itself and
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

II 5, 417a21-b16.
Cf. Burnyeat 2008, 270 and 270 (note 125).
II 5, 417b8–9.
See, for example, Phys III 3.
Burnyeat 2002, 64–6.
Heinaman 2007, 162–5
Burnyeat 2008, 276.
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its end terminus and felt no problem referring to such a transition as such
as an activity proper32. But in the case of physical things, like elements,
there is an obvious distinction between the transition itself (to be moved
to a natural place) and its end terminus (to be in a natural place). In other
words, their natural motions take time; that is, elements do not arrive at
their destination instantaneously. It is this manifestation of the difference
between the transition itself and its end terminus (which is absent in the
case of knower but present in the elements) that seems to give rise to one
of the controversies surrounding the natural motion of elements: whether
to call such a transition a motion or an activity proper33.
I shall also sidestep this controversy, for regardless of whether the second transition is called a motion or an activity proper, our task is discover
the analogy that Aristotle is drawing between the knower example and
physical things. What is the similarity between them that Aristotle is alluding to? The clue is found in the passage of Physics VIII 4 itself. What
we find there is that Aristotle emphasizes the active aspect of the second
sense of potentiality. At 255b8–12, where he is supposed to be explaining
how the different senses of potentiality are applicable to the light and the
heavy, the word potentiality appears only once (255b9–10). Rather, actuality (b11) and its cognate, ‘e0nergh/sei’ (b10), appear. And, at
255b17–21, when he is explaining the nature of the second sense of potentiality for the second time he says, ‘it becomes active and goes ever upward (e0nergei= kai\ a0ei\ a0nwte/rw gi/gnetai)’34.
If we turn to de Anima III 4, we see Aristotle describing a person with
the second sense of potentiality as having the ability to realize one's own
capacity on one's own (du/nhtai e0nergei=n di’ au9tou=)35. Having this sense
of potentiality implies that one is capable of realizing one’s capacity on its
own (unless something prevents it) without needing any further active
cause. My suggestion, then, is that it is in virtue of this active aspect of the
second sense of potentiality (which I shall henceforth refer to as an active
capacity) that Aristotle is drawing a close analogy between the different
kind of knower and physical things; and I shall argue that it is precisely
the application of ‘the notion of the active capacity’ (AC) that will help
us identity the external mover.
Let me first explain AC more clearly. In the Generation of Animals II
1, we see Aristotle appeals to an active sense of potentiality to resolve the

32
33

34
35

See, Heinaman 2007, 165.
See, for example, Gill 1991, 33–34; Simplicius (see In Caelo, 65, 22–8; 95, 28–30;
and 251, 28–9); Broadie 1993, 392; Hankinson 2002, 123 (note 249) and 126 (note
289); and Hankinson 2004, 140 (note 365).
255b21.
429b7.
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problem of embryology36. There he has to account for how the motion of
semen causes successive development of the different parts of the embryo.
The problem is that he is committed to the two crucial aspects of his
doctrine of motion: that it is what is in actuality that realizes what is
potential (734a30–3) and that the mover and the moved must be in
contact (734a4–5). Of course, for Aristotle, the mover is the father. But
after the copulation the movements in the semen that are responsible
for forming the embryo keep going without the presence of the father.
Aristotle solves the problem by compromising the simultaneity principle
that the mover and the moved must both be operative at the same time
and they must do so by being in contact. As long as the mover was once
in contact and has initiated the movement, it no longer needs to be
there (734b13–18). The movements can be transmitted in the form of
an active capacity. To illustrate the principle, he points to how the miraculous automaton works (734b11–15). Once the external agent initiates
the motion, it is transmitted successively to the different parts of the
automaton. Note that Aristotle here also appeals to the different senses
of potentiality (using the different kinds of knower) (735a9–11) to
identify the pertinent sense of potentiality to solve the problem of embryology.
Once we recognize that Aristotle acknowledged the existence of such an
active capacity, there is no longer any necessity to look for the actual mover
present at the time that the potentiality in question is being realized (as long
as the moved was in contact with the mover at some earlier point). Otherwise, one would be hard pressed to find such a mover for the natural motion of the sublunary elements. An exception is, perhaps, to posit their natural places as their movers, as some have done37. However, there are at least
two advantages to my interpretation: 1) we are no longer compelled to seek
the textual evidence for natural places as the actual movers of the natural
motion of sublunary elements outside of Physics VIII 4 (where Aristotle
does not mention them); and 2) we need not touch the controversy38

36
37
38

I have examined this problem of embryology elsewhere. For my detail analyses, see
Katayama 1999, 81–93.
See, for example, Lang 1992, 77 and Sorabji 1988, 220–2. Cf. Ross 1936, 721–2
and 725–6.
For the controversy surrounding how to interpret Aristotle’s claim that natural places
have a certain power in Phys IV 1, 208b11 passage, see, for example, Simplicius in his
commentaries on Book IV, In Phys., 525, 27–9; 527, 10–12 and 600, 30–7 and on
Book VIII 4, In Phys., 1219, 44–7; Ross 1936, 563; Goldschmidt 1956, 88, 99 (note
5) and 108; Bergson 1970, 22, 26–7, 52; Nussbaum 1978, 299; Sorabji 1988, 143,
187, 187 (note 6), 202 and 222; Algora 1995, 153–181 and 195–221; Bodnár 1997,
99 (footnote 26); and Morison 2002, 49–53.
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as to whether or not, for Aristotle, natural place has such a causal
power39.
Once we grant that Aristotle appealed to AC to explain the mover of
the natural sublunary elementary motion based on the different senses of
potentiality (and in turn actuality), it is easy to see how AC is closely
related to NP: the strict sense of the heavy and the light (to be in natural
place) is an actuality proper that is realized when they arrive at their natural end-terminus; and the loose sense of the heavy and the light (to be
moved to natural place) is a transition to their natural end terminus, a
transition which is attained by their receiving the active capacity which is
also an actuality but yet potential as well. In other words, because elements
are said to be actuality in these two senses, Aristotle is justified in defining
their having nature in terms of the principle of both motion and rest; that
is, AC can be used to justify NP.
iii
I have so far established the following: NP tells us that the natural motion
of the sublunary elements requires an external mover; and AC tells us how
the external mover causes their natural motion: namely, by having transmitted an active capacity to the sublunary elements. I shall now identify
this external mover. But before we do so, the crucial difference that exists
between the motion of animate and inanimate things needs to be addressed. In so doing, I shall now underscore the importance of the role
that the soul plays as a mover in the account of Aristotle’s theory of natural elemental motions. Note that Aristotle denies that the sublunary elements are capable of self-motion because they are inanimate40. Further
note that Aristotle also denies that motion belongs to the principle of life

39

40

Weisheipl (1985; which is primarily a collection of essays he wrote from
1954–1981) argues against the view that, for both Aquinas and Aristotle, actual contact is required between the mover and the moved throughout the duration of the
motion (see, for example, 14–16 [note 61]; 19–20; 78; and 80). The difference between my view and Weisheipl is that he underestimates Aristotle’s deep commitment
to the contact principle. It is not an accident that Aristotle describes both the natural
sublunary elemental motion and embryology as very difficult problem: ma/lista d'
a0porei=tai (245b33) and a0pori/a plei/wn (733b23), respectively. Contrary to
Weisheipl’s account (see, for example, 106–16 and 119), Aristotle was willing to give
up the contact principle only when it failed to account for the phenomenon in question, and he did so only in the limited and exceptional cases.
Phys VIII 4, 255a6–7. See also Cael I 7, 275b26, II 2 and 284b30–4; as well as MA
4, 700a14–16 and 6, 700b6, 9–10.
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itself – the soul41. Aristotle’s view is that neither the soul nor the body,
each on its own, is capable of moving itself. It is only when the soul and
the body are combined together that self-motion is possible, in the sense
that the composite considered as the whole moves itself by having the
principle of moving (i.e. the soul) and the principle of being moved (i.e.
the body). Now the fact that the soul and the body are the mover and the
moved in the living things is not controversial and commentators from
antiquity have generally accepted it42. The point, however, that I want to
highlight is this. It is the consistent application of ‘the soul (as the
mover)/ the body (as the moved) distinction’ (S/B) that will ultimately
help us resolves all three aporiai of this paper. A consistent interpretation
of Aristotle’s theory of the natural motions of both the sublunary elements
(which are inanimate) and the celestial element (which is animate) hinges
on S/B.
The importance of S/B also emerges in the analogy between the
knower example and physical things when we examine how the active capacity manifests itself differently between them. This difference can be
seen by examining Graham’s complaint (1999)43. Graham argues that even
if one's primary teacher causes one to change from illiterate to literate, the
teacher is not the present and proximate cause of one's reading today. In
other words, even if the teacher is the cause of one's change from a
knower 1) to a knower 2), she plays no direct role in one's present actualization from a knower 2) to a knower 3). Thus, there are two different
causes of two different transitions. In the same way, Graham argues ‘to
invoke the producer of air in explaining in general way why air goes up is
to confuse a question about the genesis of a portion of air with the question of why air, whatever its origin, goes up’ (84).
Graham is right that in the case of a reader, it is indeed true that the
original teacher plays no direct role in one's present realization of the ability to read, but the pertinent question he failed to ask is this: what is
causing the actualization of this ability in the case of the reader? The answer is the reader herself44. It is ‘up to the reader’45 to decide when to
actualize her potentiality to read; that is, the reader controls how she is to
realize this active capacity. That is why there are two distinct causes for
two different transitions: the teacher is the one who conferred an active
capacity (in this case, the ability to read) to her student and the reader
41
42
43
44
45

See de An I 3.
See, for example, Simplicius (In Phys., 1208, 30–1), Aquinas (In Phys., VIII, lect. 7,
para. 1024), Furley 1978, 5 and Graham 1999, 81.
83–4.
See de An II 5, 417a27–8 and 417b23–4.
Of course, the actual psychological mechanism that explains how our cognitive capacity is ‘up to us’ is controversial. See, for example, Weden 1994 and Shileds 1994.
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herself is the one who directs and controls it. No such distinction can be
made in the case of inanimate objects. The air, once it is transformed
from water, has the active capacity (that is, the lightness) that must be
realized. It is not up to the air. There is nothing in air that could prevent
or postpone the realization of this active capacity to be in motion. There
are no internal causes to control or direct the active capacity; only external
impediments can obstruct its realization. In the case of the air, then, what
caused it to be light by transformation from water is also the cause of its
motion as well; that is, the generator, by conferring the active capacity to a
simple body, has at the same time imparted motion, since it is the initial
conferring of the active capacity that initiates the motion.
Even if self-motion is understood broadly to include all changes (and
not narrowly confined to locomotion)46, active capacities of all kinds are
controlled by the soul. For example, in the case of non-rational animate
entities, such as plants, it is the soul that is the principle that causes its
change, such as growth. In de Anima II 447, Aristotle contrasts the manner
in which fire is said to ‘grow’ and the manner in which plants actually grow.
Fire ‘grows’ without any limit and it does so as long as there is something to
burn, but plants by nature are constituted with the limit and the proportion
(pe/raj kai\ lo/goj) that belong to the soul; that is, it is the soul that is
responsible for regulating the growth of a body48. No such principle is
found in the case of fire; hence, its ‘growth’ cannot be limited internally.
Only the external impediment or obstacle can limit its ‘growth’.
In animate entities, then, it is ultimately their souls that are responsible for controlling (or regulating or determining) the manner in which
their active capacities are to be realized, whether the capacity in question
is innate (as in the case of plant's ability to grow) or is acquired by means
of an external agent (as in the case of a person's ability to read). Thus, it
is their souls that are the essential causes of realizing the capacities of animate entities. However, in inanimate entities (as in the case of the sublunary elements), because they lack such an internal principle49, it is always
the external agent that is the essential cause of the active capacity in question50, both in terms of bringing it into existence and realizing it51. There46
47
48
49
50

51

This is important because in Phys II 1 plants are included as having the internal
principle of motion, which is the concern of our second aporia.
416a9–18.
Cf. Gill 1991, 21.
See Cael, II 2, 284b33–4.
In Shields 2008, where he argues for the view that only livings are substances, he calls
this sort of capacity which is distinctive of life ‘cybernetic’ (138–9). For my view on
living things and substances, see Katayama 1999 and 2008.
This is true even in the case of what is hot, which Aristotle often uses as an example
of a mover (see, for example, Phys VII.4, 255a22–3); for, fire burns something be-
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fore, the generator is not only the essential cause of the transformation of
the sublunary elements but also the essential, and not the accidental cause,
of their natural motions as well.
But what about the obstacle remover? On the one hand, at
255b24–9, Aristotle calls it an accidental cause; on the other hand, in the
concluding section of VIII 4, where Aristotle claims to have successfully
defended the main thesis of the chapter – that whatever is in motion is
moved by something – he insists that either the generator or the obstacle
remover (256a1–2) is the mover of the natural sublunary elemental motion, as if either of them could be the essential cause of the motion. There
are two possible readings52: 1) the appearance of Aristotle’s concluding
statement notwithstanding, the generator is the only essential cause of the
natural sublunary elemental motion; or 2) despite Aristotle’s claim at
255b24–9, the obstacle remover could also be their essential cause in some
circumstances (although they are not spelled out).
Option 1) has been defended by others53, and I am happy to join
them. However, I shall also entertain option 2), for the following reason:
that it is possible for an external agent, without being a generator of an
element, to bring into an existence either an upward or downward capacity in an element. Let me illustrate by using the following two examples.
In the first example, Jane lifts up a lump of earth by hand; that is,
without transforming it to any other simple body, she is moving it from
its natural to its unnatural place; that is, the earth has been displaced from
its natural place (more or less)54. As a result, the earth acquires the tendency to go downward. It is now heavy in the loose sense; that is, the
transition from the earth being heavy in the strict sense (to be down) to
the loose sense (tendency to move downwards) has been caused by the
external agent. It is the essential cause of the earth acquiring this active
capacity. However, this active capacity cannot be realized if Jane simply
holds on to it. The reason why, then, the earth does not fall is that it is
being prevented from falling. If Jane releases the earth, it falls down be-

52
53
54

cause the generator has transformed it from something cold (255b6–7), or it has
been displaced from its natural place. Without such a transformation or movement
away from its natural place caused by an external agent (i.e. ultimately by the movements of heavenly bodies), it would not be in contact with anything that could be
consumed by fire (see Phys VIII 7, 260b1–4) any more than it would move upward.
Rather, it would simply remain in the upper region (without motion and without
burning anything).
On the assumption, of course, that I have now excluded the possibility that both of
them are accidental causes of the natural sublunary elemental motion.
See, for example, Aquinas (In Phys., VIII, lect. 8, para. 1035); Algra 1995, 211 (note
48); and Scharle 2008, 172–4.
Cf. Cael I 8, 276b21–5.
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cause she has now removed the obstacle that prevented its downward
movement. What we have in this case is that the same external agent is
both the cause of the earth’s enforced and natural motion. As the result,
the one that is responsible for the simple body acquiring a given active
capacity and the one that removes the obstacle that impedes its realization
are identical (i.e. they are both Jane). In other words, Jane is both an
essential and an accidental mover of the earth. Let me now separate these
two movers by using two different people.
In the second example, then, Jill lifts up a lump of earth by hand and
places it in a pot on the table. Jack comes along and bumps into the table
and tips the pot and as a result the earth falls to the ground. In this case,
Jack (as an obstacle remover) is an accidental cause of earth falling and Jill
the essential cause, since it was she that originally caused the earth acquiring the active capacity. Note that the actual examples that Aristotle uses (a
person who removes the column that supports something or one who removes the stone that holds a wineskin in water)55 are like Jack. They are
not identified as the people who were originally responsible for placing
something on the column or a stone that holds the wineskin. In other
words, Aristotle identifies only an obstacle remover like Jack as an accidental cause.
But what about Jill? She is not a generator56, nor is she an obstacle
remover, like Jack. Aristotle is silent on this matter. On my account, however, she is an essential cause of the natural motion of the earth, since it is
because of her that the earth has acquired the active capacity. So either
Aristotle does not take into account of the situation like that of Jill or (to
go on a limb) Aristotle may be implicitly thinking of an example like Jill
in his remark; for Aristotle hints at 255b27–9 that in the case of the ball
that bounces back, it is the thrower who is an essential mover and not the
wall which is an accidental mover. In other words, Jill (as an obstacle remover) is an essential mover, since she was in some sense an obstacle for
the earth to remain in its natural place57.
55
56
57

Phys VIII 4, 255b25–6.
We should also note that Jill could be a generator of an element as well; for example,
when she boils water in a kettle.
In her attempt to explain the seasonal rain of Phys II 8, Scharle 2008 defends Aristotle’s refined view of water moving into natural place as occurring ‘naturally and
teleologically only upon being generated by the sun (i.e. in the winter)’ (171; her emphasis). In other words, according to Scharle, the true nature of water is not only to
receive a specific active capacity of relative heaviness but also must be received by a
specific agent. In this paper, I shall sidestep the purported refined view of Aristotle,
since 1) in Phys VIII 4, there is no hint at all that the nature of the sublunary elements are defined in terms of the nature of an external agent that explain their natural motion and 2) my account of the natural motion of the sublunary elements is
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Regardless of whether Aristotle defends option 1) or 2), I submit that
in Physics VIII 4, Aristotle has identified the essential and not only accidental causes of the natural motion of the sublunary elements.

III
My next task is to resolve the second aporia by showing how my explication of the natural sublunary elemental motion in Physics VIII 4 is consistent with the view that Aristotle defends in Physics II 1. The fact that
these two chapters can be made consistent by citing the famous passage at
VIII 4, 255b29–31 is well attested58. The passage states that a sublunary
element ‘has a principle of motion, not of causing motion or of acting
on something, but of being acted upon (kinh/sewj a0rxh\n e1xei, ou0 tou=
kinei=n ou0de\ tou= poiei=n, a0lla\ tou= pa/sxein)’59. By saying that an element has a principle of motion, Aristotle is affirming the doctrine of Book
II 1. What he is doing here is qualifying or specifying the manner in
which a sublunary element has this principle. He does this by identifying
an active and a passive sense: the mover and the moved, respectively.
I shall now apply ‘the precise formulation of the doctrine of natural
places’ (NP), ‘the notion of active capacity’ (AC) and ‘the soul (as the
mover)/ the body (as the moved) distinction’ (S/B) to explain a number
of crucial distinctions Aristotle draws in Physics II 1. Let us first turn to
S/B. One of the crucial ones occurs at 192b8–193a1 where he argues that,
contrary to a natural substance, an artifact is said to have a principle of
motion only in the accidental manner. It is instructive to note what Aristotle does not mention in this passage: namely, that not only does an
artifact, such as a bed, have the natural downward tendency, but so does a
natural substance, such as a horse. When pushed, they will both fall down
from a cliff because they are made up primarily of earthy materials60. But
they have this natural tendency not qua their forms but qua their matters61. Since it is in virtue of the form, rather than the matter, that an
entity (whether in nature or in art) is defined as what it is, whatever belongs to an entity qua matter will belong to it accidentally. This kind of

58
59
60
61

inclusive (that is, it accounts for all instances of their natural motions, regardless of
whether the elements are generated naturally by the sun or artificially by a human or
by any other agents).
Cf. Furley 1978, 3–4; Johnson 2005, 141; and Scharle 2008, 171–2; see also Simplicius (In Cael, 387, 5–12).
Graham's translation with a slight modification (1999).
Simplicius' example is a man falling from a roof (In Cael, 40, 16–20). Cf. Hankinson
2002, 113 (note 93).
See Gill 1989, 169 for a similar analysis.
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accidental movement requires an external cause (like pushing) and, thus,
any composite of form and matter is also capable of accidental motion
qua moved.
In the case of a horse, however, it has a principle of motion essentially
as well. It has an internal principle of motion qua mover in virtue of its
form – the soul. It is the animate form of a horse that allows other movements that are natural to a horse. And the natural movements of a horse
are defined in terms of its form rather than its matter. In de Caelo II 662,
Aristotle points out that the sublunary elements are causes of ‘impotency’
(h( a0dunami/a), which is contrary to nature. In animals, examples are old
age and deterioration. He suspects that the cause is that animals are made
up of elements that are not in their proper places. The soul, then, is preventing them from being in their proper places. Thus, all movements of
animals defined naturally qua the animate form are all contrary to nature
defined qua sublunary elements63.
An artifact, which has an inanimate form, has no principle of motion
qua mover. The sources of its movements are all external or, as Aristotle
puts it, are ‘in another and outside (e0n a1lloij kai\ e1cwqen)’64. In Physics
VIII 265, he declares that in the case of inanimate things there is always
something that moves them from outside (e1cwqen). This is true, as we
saw, even in the case of what Aristotle calls a miraculous automaton.
Although it appears to move on its own, it actually requires an external
cause that initially sets the motion going66. We have so far discussed the
crucial difference between animate natural substances and artifacts. What
is critical for our discussion however, as some have noted, is to explicate
the difference between artifacts and inanimate natural substances – the
sublunary elements67. Both have inanimate forms and both require an external cause for their movements and yet the sublunary elements have a
principle of motion qua moved essentially and not accidentally like artifacts. Or, in other words, how does the active capacity of the sublunary
elements differ from that of artifacts?
Let me first illustrate the difference with an example (I shall here appeal to NP and AC). Suppose we take a lump of earth. As we have
pointed out, earth's nature is to be in the center of the universe, which is
its proper resting place. It also has the capacity to acquire the motion to
62
63
64
65
66
67

288b13–18.
Cf. Guthrie 1939, 64 (note c).
Phys II 1, 192b29.
252b21–3.
See GA II 1, 734b9–13 and II 5, 741b8–9.
See, for example, Matthen 2001, 185–7. If my explication is successful, Matthen’s
holistic thesis – that the nature of the sublunary elements is defined derivatively in
terms of the nature of totality – will be rendered otiose.
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its natural place, a capacity which cannot be acquired on its own. It must
be first moved away from its natural place by force; it is in virtue of having been displaced from its natural place that it acquires this capacity. It is
the external cause that is responsible for the lump of earth's acquisition of
the tendency to go downwards. This is the only active capacity (that is,
the heaviness) that it can acquire by nature. Now, although it is possible
to cause various contrary movements to a lump of earth by throwing it in
many directions, it is not possible for the earth to acquire any other active
capacity, even if one were to attempt to ‘habituate’ it by repeated throwing68. The only active capacity it is able to acquire by nature is the tendency to go downwards. The form of the earth, by nature, restricts the
kind of active capacity it will acquire. In this sense, then the earth has a
nature; that is, it has a principle of motion qua the moved69. It is an internal, and not an external, principle because the earth has it in virtue of its
inanimate form, and no external agent can ever alter it in any respect.
Furthermore, it is an essential internal principle, since its natural movement is defined in terms of its essential nature.
In contrast, no such internal principle is ever found in the inanimate
forms of artifacts. Artifacts have no innate tendency to change. Both
their forms and matters70 are artificially imposed by external agents. The
nature of the form and the kind of matter that is required are both
externally determined, including whatever active capacities artifacts are
capable of receiving. A craftsman is incapable of completely eradicating
the natural tendencies of the elements from which the artificial matter is
composed. But the movement that results from such tendencies is accidental to the ‘nature’ of an artifact, although internal in the sense that it
exists in its material; thus, whatever movement an artifact may be capable of, the movement has either an accidental internal origin or an external mover.
To clarify the distinctions I have been drawing, I shall schematize
them in terms of the principles of motion. First, there are two kinds of
the principle of motion: 1) the mover and 2) the moved. The moved are
divided into i) essential and ii) accidental and which are in turn subdivided into a) internal and b) external. The mover can also be divided and
subdivided accordingly, but the details of these divisions do not concern
us, except that the relevant mover under the discussion is the soul, which
is an essential internal principle. I shall call the scheme, ‘the scheme of
classification of the principles of motion’ (SC). It is as follows:
68
69
70

See NE, II 1, 1103a19–23.
Cf. Furley 1978, 4.
In Phys II 2, 194b7–8, Aristotle says that in the case of artificial object, it is we who
produce the matter.
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Principles of Motion
i) essential:

a) internal (by nature)
b) external (contrary to nature)
ii) accidental: a) internal (by nature)
b) external (contrary to nature)

Elements have a principle of motion qua moved, which is essential and
internal (2.i.a); artifacts such as amazing automata have a principle of motion qua moved, which is essential and external (2.i.b); and artifacts such
as beds and garments have a principle of motion qua moved, which is
accidental and internal (2.ii.a). Note the similarity between SC and the
one Aristotle himself uses in the opening passage71 of Physics VIII 4.
First, Aristotle classifies both the mover and the moved in terms of
the distinction between essential and accidental. A mover accidentally
moves something either by belonging to or by being part of the mover;
and similarly, mutatis mutandis, in the case of the things accidentally
moved. An essential mover and a thing essentially moved are then defined
negatively: that is, an essential mover moves something either by not belonging to or by not being part of the mover; and again similarly, mutatis
mutandis, in the case of a thing essentially moved.
Without further explaining the distinction he has just drawn or providing us with any example to illustrate them, Aristotle immediately classifies the things essentially moved72 into two classes: those that are moved
by themselves and those that are moved by another. They are in turn subdivided into two: by nature; and, by force and contrary to nature73.
In his scheme of classification, Aristotle does not begin simply with
the division into accidental and essential motions (as some commentators
71
72

73

254b7–24.
At 254b12–14, since Aristotle does not explicitly mention what he is classifying, it is
unclear as to whether he is still classifying both the mover and the moved (tw=n
kinou/ntwn kai\ kinoume/nwn) as in 254b7 or has shifted his emphasis only on the
moved. Ross’ gloss is ‘Of things moved per se’ (1936, 435); but in Apostle 1980, we
read more ambiguously, ‘Of things which are essentially in motion’ (156), and Graham 1999, ‘Of intrinsic motions’ (9). Since motion essentially belongs only to the
things moved, any of these interpretations are correct (if indeed Aristotle has shifted
his emphasis), unless, of course, one is using the term ‘motion’ as the way to capture
the ambiguity (as Hardie and Gaye in Barnes 1984 seem to do in their translation:
‘Of things which move in their own right’). I have followed Ross' gloss here since
Aristotle seems to be focusing on the moved. However, the views defended in this
paper are not affected either way.
I shall use the terms ‘by force (to\ bi/a|)’ and ‘contrary to nature (para\ fu/sin)’
interchangeably, just as Aristotle does in Cael III 2, 300a23. See also Phys VIII 4,
255b32.
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gloss74), but rather with the accidental and essential movers as well as the
things accidentally and essentially moved75. Aristotle's classification becomes rather complicated and cumbersome when the things essentially
moved are divided and further subdivided in terms of the ‘moved by self/
moved by another’ and the ‘moved by nature/moved by force’ distinctions,
respectively. Although every detail76 of these divisions does not concern us,
note the scheme of classification in terms of the distinctions, ‘the mover/
the moved’, ‘essential/accidental’, and ‘by nature/contrary to nature’.
Now if ‘the internal/external’ distinction of SC is replaced respectively
by ‘the by nature/by force or contrary to nature’ distinction that Aristotle
gives in Physics VIII 4, the two sets of classifications are similar77. And it
seems that ‘the internal/external’ and ‘the by nature/by force or contrary
to nature’ distinctions are interchangeable, since if a thing is moved by
force or contrary to nature, the origin of mover is external to the nature
of the thing (and vice versa), and if moved by nature, then the origin is
internal to its nature (and vice versa). If so, we can consistently square the
doctrine of a principle of motion presented by Aristotle in Physics II 1
with the view he defends in Physics VIII 4 that whatever is in motion is
moved by something, including the natural sublunary elemental motion;
for, by employing SC, we can see clearly how an element, as the moved,
has an essential, internal principle of motion.

IV
My final task of this paper is to resolve the third aporia by showing how
the four doctrines – ‘the precise formulation of the doctrine of natural
74
75

76
77

See, for example, Graham 1999, 74, in his commentary on 254b7–12.
Throughout their commentaries, both Simplicius (In Phys., 1206–1209) and Aquinas (In Phys., VIII, lecture 7, para. 1021–1024) keep the distinction between the
mover and the moved intact.
See, for example, Lang 1992, 69 and Graham 1999, 74–8, for their detailed discussions.
There are two main differences between the two schemata (the one in Phys VIII 4
and SC). 1) I have omitted the moved by self/moved by another distinction, since
strictly speaking what is moved by self has two principles – the mover and the
moved, and thus it is misleading to place it under the heading of the moved (as
Aristotle seems to be doing – see my note 72). 2) At 254b18–19, Aristotle classifies
some of the movements of the body of animals as 2.i.a. I classify them as 2.ii.b (as we
shall see). This difference is due to fact that the internal/external or by nature/contrary to nature distinction can be drawn in a different manner. Aristotle is thinking
in terms of the natural movements of animal's body, whereas I am focusing specifically on the natural motions of elements (given the topic of my paper); hence, as I
have stated above in the main text, the motion that is natural to the body of an
animal qua animal body is contrary to nature qua elements.
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places’ (NP), ‘the notion of active capacity’ (AC), ‘the soul (as the mover)/
the body (as the moved) distinction’ (S/B) and ‘the scheme of classification of the principles of motion’ (SC) – that are used to account for the
natural sublunary elemental motions are also applicable to account for the
natural motion of the celestial element – aether. The first thing to note is
that the two movers (the generator and the obstacle remover) of the natural sublunary elemental motions cannot be the movers of aether. In de
Caelo III 278, Aristotle points out that the impulse (r9oph/) of some79
bodies is due to heaviness and lightness. Since aether has no weight and
lightness80, the cause of its movement must in principle be different. How
should we account for its natural motion?
Let us first turn to NP81. First we need to examine whether the doctrine is applicable to the celestial region at all, for strictly speaking according to Aristotle it has no ‘place’. In Physics IV 4, he defines place as ‘the
limit of the surrounding body’ (212a6) and in IV 5, he explicitly denies
that the heaven has a place82. Nevertheless, in the de Caelo, when he draws
a close analogy between the sublunary and celestial elements, he speaks as
though their movements, both straight and circular, occur in place83. And
he explicitly assigns ‘places’ (oi9 to/poi) to all elements84. Thus, even if the
celestial element does not occupy a place in a strict sense, it does so in
some derivative sense85. On this condition, then, it would not be unreasonable to appeal to NP to account for the celestial motion86.
78
79
80
81

82
83
84
85

86

301a22–3.
Cf. Guthrie 1939, 277 (note a) and Elders 1965, 287.
See, for example, Cael I 3, 269b29–31.
Since NP occurs both in the Cael and the Phys VIII 4 passages (as I argued in section
II.i), I can sidestep any developmental issues concerning these two works, as regards
the application of NP as an interpretive strategy. Discussion concerning the issue of
developments, especially Aristotle's view concerning the Prime Mover, see, for example, Guthrie 1939, xv-xxxvi; Chreniss 1944, Appendix x, 583–602; Broadie 1993,
Kosman 1994; Judson 1994; and Bodnár 1997, 84 (notes 4 and 5).
212b8–10 and 16–22. Cf. Waterlow 1982, 261; and Algra 1995, 184–5, and 185
(note 142), and 195 (note 5).
See, for example, I 2, 268b14–18; I 3, 270b20–4; and I 7, 275b6–7.
I 8, 277b13–17.
It is not surprising that the definition of place in Phys IV 1–5 is applicable primarily
to the bodies in the sublunary region since Aristotle frames it within the context of
his theory of natural sublunary elemental motion. See, especially, IV 4, 211a3–6. Cf.
Hussey 1983, 121–2; Furley 1976, 88; Burnyeat 1984, 234; and Morison 2002, 1–2.
Furthermore, in the Cael, Aristotle appeals to this definition of ‘place’ in IV 2,
310b7–8, only when he is exclusively analyzing the sublunary elements (although a
commentator like Simplicius appeals to this definition throughout his analysis of
Cael; see, for example, 231, 15–18; 269, 15–25 and 287, 23–26).
Cf. Hussey 1983, 120; Cherniss 1944, 406 (note 332); Algra 1995, 185 and 187–8;
Morison 2002, 166–9; and Bostock 2006, 132–3.
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Now, what is implied by NP is that natural motions and unnatural
motions of elements are defined in terms of their natural resting places. In
contrast to the four sublunary elements, what aether lacks is unnatural
motion87. It has only a natural motion which can be defined in terms of
place. Instead of defining natural motion as a movement towards its natural place (as in the case of sublunary elements), the natural motion of
aether can be defined as a movement in its natural place88. So although it
is always in motion, it is resting in some sense89. This is exactly what Aristotle affirms in Physics VIII 9, 265b1–290.
The reason why the circular motion of celestial element is unceasing is
that it is always in its proper place; for natural motion ceases when a body
in question arrives at its proper place91. But even if it is true that it is
unceasing, that is, its motion has no beginning and end, Aristotle insists
that ‘it must have a principle, from which it would have begun had it a
beginning, and would be started again should it stop’92. Here Aristotle
suggests that the celestial element would come to a stop without a principle of motion.
But what is this principle and how does it cause the celestial element's
movement? Here S/B is relevant; for the most obvious candidate is the
soul, since the heaven is said to be alive93 and it is moved in a manner
that is analogous94 to the way in which animals and plants are said to act
(pra=cin)95. The difference96, however, is this. Animals and plants move
themselves contrary to the natural tendency of the elements they are made
up of (since these elements are not in their proper places) and as a result
87
88

89
90
91
92
93

94
95
96

See, for example, Cael II 6, 288b18–19.
In Cael, Aristotle assigns a proper place to the celestial element (I 8, 277b13–17)
and he describes its circular motion as the movement to and from the same place (I
4, 271a23–4 [although the words e0pi\ to\ au0to\ ga\r are missing in some manuscripts – see the apparatus criticus of Allan 1936] and I 9, 279b1–3). See also I 9,
278b28–9 and II 6, 288b19–20. Cf. Simplicius (In Cael, 289, 31 and 292, 6); Solmsen 1960, 289 (note 5); and Nussbaum 1978, 134 (note 42) and 280.
Although it is not unqualifiedly at rest. Cf. Bergson 1970, 60–3 and Gerson 1990,
280 (note 60).
Although at Phys VI 9, 240a29–b7, he emphasizes the aspect of its movement rather
than rest.
Cael 1.9, 279b1–3.
Cael II 2, 285b6–8. Guthrie's translation (1939). Cf. Seeck 1969, 211. See also Hankinson's interpretation of Simplicius's view (2006, 114–115 [note 485]).
Cael II 2, 285a27–30 and II 12, 292a20–21. Cf. Simplicius (for example, In Cael,
370, 25; 378, 10–31; and 382, 8–11); Cherniss 1944, 465 (note 413), and 541; and
Gerson 1990, 283 (note 80).
Cf. Cherniss 1944, 601; Nussbaum 1978, 120–1 and 292; and Leggatt 1995, 21.
Cael II 12, 292b1–2.
See also Nussbaum 1978, 158–9.
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their movements suffers ‘retardation’ (a1nesij) through ‘loss of power’
(a0dunami/a), which is contrary to nature. The examples of the loss of
power include old age and decay97. No such retardation or loss of power is
possible for the movement of heavenly spheres and bodies, because they
are simple, unmixed and in their proper place (e0n th=| oi0kei/a| xw/ra|)98.
That is why, unlike animals and plants, heavenly spheres and bodies are
moved by their souls without force and effort99.
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle describes the nature of heavenly bodies in
terms of matter. They are eternal, incapable of any change and will never
be worn out from their movement, because they have matter only with
respect to change of place100. And Aristotle denies that matter itself could
move itself101. Rather it is the form which exists in actuality that will cause
the matter which exists in potentiality to be moved.
Thus, the nature of all five elements is to be in their proper places. So,
just as the actuality of the light is to be up and the heavy is to be down in
the sublunary region, the actuality of the celestial element is to be in the
celestial region. The natural motions of sublunary elements are to move
towards their resting places and the natural motion of celestial element is
to move around in its natural resting place. So, just as what it is to be light
and heavy in the loose sense is described as ‘their nature to some place’,
what it is to be celestial element in the loose sense can be described as ‘its
nature from one place to another (pe/fuke/n poqe\n poi)’102. Without the
mover, however, aether will cease to move.
In fact, Judson 1994103 entertained the possibility that the celestial element could be ‘dormant’ and without the soul it would not move. However, he dismissed this possibility because this view would ‘introduce the
troublesome disanalogy104 with the sublunary elements’ (159) since ‘their
natural motion requires no activation by souls or any other sort of agent’
(158). However, as I argued, no such disanalogy occurs because the movers
of the natural motion of sublunary elements, the generators, are indeed
ultimately living celestial bodies. It is their movements that cause the
transformations of the sublunary elements; in other words, the natural
motion of sublunary elements is also due to ‘activation by souls’.
97
98

99
100
101
102
103
104

Cael II 6, 288b13–18.
Cael II 6, 288b18–22. Aristotle seems to be using ‘to/poj’ and ‘xw/ra’ interchangeably, as in 288b13–18. Cf. Mendell 1987, 214–217; Algra 1995, 34 and 36–38; and
Morison 2002, 22–3 as well as note 54.
Cael II 1, 284a13–18 and 27–35.
See Q8, 1050b20–8 and L2, 1069b24–6.
Metaphys L6, 1071b29–30.
Metaphys Q8, 1050b21 and L2, 1069b26. Cf. Joachim 1922, xxxiv-xxxv.
See 157–161.
Cf. Guthrie 1939, xxxii–xxxiii.
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We have so far kept intact the close analogy between the natural
motions of sublunary and celestial elements by applying NP and S/B to
both cases. This close analogy will be maintained in defining the nature
of celestial element by applying AC and SC. The importance of defining
its nature can be seen in the frustration expressed by a number of commentators who have delved into Aristotle's theory of the celestial natural
motion. For example, we read in Waterlow 1982: ‘Since an eternal body
cannot decompose, the primum mobile has no nature of its own in this
sense, nor in the sense of requiring to be constrained to move105’ (261).
Bodnár 1997 says: ‘If there is no autonomous phase of this motion, but
the celestial element is always “taken by the hand” and moved by its
mover, it will be seriously questionable to what extent the celestial
spheres possess a nature at all’ (110). I shall now defend the claim that
the celestial element has a nature in the very same way that the sublunary
elements do.
Let us now employ SC. Suppose we compare and contrast animals
and heavenly spheres and bodies. Both have the soul as the principle of
motion qua mover, which is essential and internal (or by nature). Animals' bodies, however, have the principle of motion qua moved, in two
senses: I) accidentally and internally (by nature), for they can fall down
a cliff because they are predominantly made of earthy materials; and II)
accidentally and externally (contrary to nature), for their bodily movements are all contrary to the natural motions of elements. Thus animals are combination (1) and (2.ii.a and 2.ii.b). Heavenly spheres and
bodies, however, have the principle of motion qua moved, which is
essential and internal (by nature). So, they are combination of (1) and
(2.i.a)106.
If we now appeal to AC, we can see that just as the sublunary elements by nature are capable of receiving only one specific kind of active
capacity, so too is the celestial element. What is unique about the relationship among the mover and the active capacity of the moved of the
celestial animate entities is that their soul always desires only one kind of
motion which their body by nature is always capable of receiving; hence,
without any effort on the part of the mover and with no resistance on
the part of the moved, unceasing transmission of circular motion is possible.

105

106

She even hints of ‘a nature-less physical substance’ (260–1), the view which she endorses again in Broadie 1993, 400. No such drastic measure is necessary (or so I hope
to show), even if the concept was not alien to Aristotle (Waterlow 1982, 261).
Cf. Simplicius (In Cael, 387, 17–19).
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V
In sum, I have achieved a consistent interpretation of the natural motions
of both the sublunary and the celestial elements by applying NP, AC, S/B
and SC in both cases. The result is that without introducing any ‘troublesome’ disanalogy between the sublunary and the celestial elements, I have
argued for the following: that in Physics VIII 4, generators (and maybe
obstacle removers in an extended sense) of the sublunary elements are the
essential movers of their natural motions; that this view is consistent with
the principle of motion defined in Physics II 1; and that, all five elements
can be classified as qua moved, which is essential and internal (or by nature) (2.i.a); that is, all five elements have a nature in the same sense,
although their essential movers differ: the mover is external in the case of
the sublunary elements because they are not alive (and when they constitute a body of an animal they are moved contrary to nature); and the
mover is internal in the case of aether, because it is the body of a living
heavenly entity such that its motion only involves its natural motion107.
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